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I By Lawrence Lessighere is a part of anyone's life that
is monitored, and there is a part
that can be searched. The monitored is that part of one's day-to-day
life that others see, that others notice, that others could take note
of, and respond to, if response were appropriate.
The searchable is the part of one's life that leaves,
or is, a record. As I walk down the street, my Privacy in
behavior is monitored. If I walked down the street
in a small village in Mainland China, my behavior Cybers ace
would be monitored quite extensively. This monitoring in both
cases would be transitory-people would notice if I were walking
with an elephant, or walking in a dress; but if there were nothing
special about my walk, if I simply blended into the crowd, then I
might be noticed for the moment, but I would be forgotten soon
after. The searchable is less transitory. The scribblings in my
diary leave a record of my thoughts. They can be searched. Things




And the recordings on my telephone answering machine
are a record of who called, and what they said. It can be
searched as well. These parts of my life don't pass so eas-
ily away. They are not in the same way ephemeral. They
instead remain to be reviewed if there is interest, and if
technology, and the law, would permit.
This is an essay about privacy. My aim is to under-
stand privacy through these two very different ideas.
Privacy, in the sense that I mean here, can be described
by these two different ideas. It stands in competition
with these ideas. It is that part of life that is left after
one subtracts, as it were, the monitored and the search-
able. A life where less is monitored is a life where more
is private; and life where less can (legally or technologi-
cally) be searched is also a life where more is private. By
understanding the technologies of these two different
ideas, the monitored and the searchable-understand-
ing, as it were, their architectures-we understand
something of the privacy that any particular social con-
text makes possible.
These contexts are many. They differ dramatically
across the world. But in this essay, I want to use this
notion of the monitored and the searchable to compare
privacy across contexts, and to see just why the context
we are about to enter is so extraordinarily different from
any we have known.
For my claim is that we are entering an age when pri-
vacy will be fundamentally altered-an age when the
extent of the monitored, and the reach of searchable, is
far greater than anything we have known thus far. We
can choose to let this change occur, or we can choose to
do something in response. After making plain the kind of
change we should expect, my aim is to make under-
standable a range of responses, and to argue, if only
implicitly, in favor of one particular response within
that range.
THE MONITORED AND THE SEARCHABLE
The monitored, as I described it, is that part of one's
life that is watched. It is the part that is watched in an
ordinary or regular way. My focus here is not the infre-
~riva c
quent spy, though if spying became extensive enough,
spying would be part of the monitored. Nor is it the peri-
odic patrol of police. The monitored, as I mean it, is the
regular and persistent watching of people or machines,
whether the behavior watched is considered "public" or not.
Monitoring in social life is quite familiar. It is life in
the small town. People living in a relatively small com-
munity, known by their neighbors, monitored as they
come and go, as they buy in the market, as they associ-
ate at a local pub. Everything in that life, it is said, is
seen. Everything in that life, it is said, was therefore
known by others. In that world, it is said, one could not
build the modern liberal conception of privacy. Privacy
was what went on in one's head, not in one's life.
This is the picture that Americans often have of
America at the founding. And it is the picture that leads
many to say that there was no concept of "privacy" in
America at the founding. Life then was life in public.
One lived in small towns, everyone knew one's neigh-
bors, and everyone knew one's business. If you stayed
out too late, or if you drank too much, or if you associat-
ed with the wrong people, or if you were rude to another
in public-if you in any way breached an elaborate set of
norms about how citizens were to behave, your breach
would be noticed, and you would suffer the consequences
of the breach. The social norms of such a society regu-
lated individuals in that society, and they could there-
fore regulate much of the individual's life in such a soci-
ety-since much of an individual's life was, in this sense,
public, or in my terms, monitored.
But this type of monitoring-the monitor of the small
town, or the monitor of the community-has important
features that we should not overlook. The first is its rel-
ative transience; the second is who is doing the monitor-
ing. My neighbors might remember that I was at the
local market Saturday morning; they may even remem-
ber with whom I was talking; but they are not likely to
remember exactly at what time I was there, or everyone
with whom I spoke. Nor will they know what I bought,
or how much I paid, or whether I paid with large denom-
ination bills or small. Of course, and again, if I did some-
thing out of the ordinary-if I brought my elephant to
the market, or came with a woman who wasn't my
wife-then my actions in a small town might be noticed
in a less transitory way. Then my actions might be
remembered. But in the ordinary case, they are not remem-
bered. They are monitored for the moment, and then the
record from that monitoring is forgotten. It is erased.
More important than its transience, however, is the
character of who is doing the monitoring. Small towns,
of course, have their busybodies-people who pry into
the business of others-and they have their moral
prudes-people whose standards are much stricter than
most. But these enforcers of community norms are on
the fringe. They define the extreme of a much narrower
core. And it this core of moral ideals that sets the limits
on freedom that a community might define. The moni-
toring of a community serves this core; but its limit sets
the limit on the burden of this monitoring. To an out-
sider, these norms might seem harsh. They might seem
wrong. But for members of that com-
munity, they are just the
sort of norms that We are enter
the "ordinary" privacy in any ser
in that com- fundamentally altered-
munity obey.
For them, the the monitored, and th
norms are not, is far greater thz
extreme or selective. know
They are not easily manip-
ulated or changed. They are a set of
influences that apply generally to like cases. And they
get their force because they are applied by the collective,
acting as a normative community.
These are the features of one particular architecture
of monitoring. In a moment we will consider other archi-
tectures with different features. But before we consider
these, consider the other part to privacy's balance-the
searchable. And consider it again, if you will, in the con-
text of a small town, or, say, in early America.
As I've defined the term, the searchable is a function
not only of what records there are that could be
searched, but also of the technologies of searching, and
the legal protections against the use of such technologies.
Consider the technologies first. In early America,
these technologies were crude. There was no simple way
to monitor-to hear, for example, a conversation going
on between two people, locked securely in their own
house. One might eavesdrop, but not easily and not with
great success. And there was no cheap way to search.
The searchable-letters, diaries, stuff in my house-was
searchable only if the police got access to my property;
the law protected me from their wrongful access, and the
very nature of the architecture of property protected
against wrongful access. The common law, and the




privacy that neither the state, nor individuals, could
easily breach.
The American Constitution guaranteed this protec-
tion of the common law. The Fourth Amendment
required that searches be conducted only if reasonable,
and that the warrant to search be granted only if there
was probable cause to search. This constitutional affir-
mation of the value of privacy combined with the legal
protections of the common law-protections again
against trespass, or other invasions of privacy-gave
legal support to the technological or architectural sup-
port for privacy that existed at the time.
The searchable then is
determined by two
ng an age when different fac-
se of that term will be tors. Thefirst is
-an age when the extent of thh e
reach of the searchable, architec-
n anything we have ture of the
.... ... f . social world at
thus far. ... the time-at the
framing, crude technologies for
searching, relatively inefficient means of collecting data.
These inefficiencies themselves constituted a kind of a
protection; they made it hard to search. And they were
supplemented by the protections of law. The law protect-
ed individuals against search; it limited the reasons the
police could use for searching; it was a second line of
defense against the invasion of prying eyes.
Privacy in this original context was then the product
of this balance. On the one side, there was a life that was
monitored by structures that support social norms. On
the other, there was the protection of law, and architec-
ture, that combined to raise the costs of searching. My
life on the street might be monitored by my neighbors,
but that monitoring produced few searchable records;
and those records that were searchable were protected
by both the architecture of property-that my walls
were not made of glass, or that my door could be double-
locked-and by law, both constitutional and as devel-
oped by the common law courts. The balance of privacy
then was this balance between the monitored and the
protections against search.
PRESERVATION ACROSS CONTEXTS
As my story so far should make clear, much about this
balance of privacy-at that time, and in any time-
depends upon existing technology. If what softens the
burdens of monitoring is that monitoring is relatively
transient, then technologies that eliminate transience
increase the burden of monitoring. If what constitutes
much of the protection of privacy in the home is that one
who would breach it must physically enter the home,
then technologies that allow invasion without physical
invasion are technologies that reduce this privacy.
Technologies in both cases can change; the question for
law in both cases is how to respond to these changes so
that privacy is preserved.
The question was best raised in the Supreme Court in
1928, in the case of Olmstead v. United States. 1 In the
midst of America's last great war on drugs-prohibi-
tion-the federal government deployed wire-tapping as
a device for collecting evidence. State laws forbade wire-
tapping, and the contracts that telephone companies
had with their customers also promised that the wires
would not be tapped. Nonetheless, the federal govern-
ment ignored these protections and invaded the privacy
of the defendants' phones. In the case of Olmstead, the
defendants challenged that wiretap on the grounds that
it violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court was not receptive. In its view,
that the Fourth Amendment protected against trespass
only. Since wiretapping did not involve a trespass, the
Fourth Amendment did not protect against it. Hence evi-
dence collected through wiretapping would be admissible to
convict Olmstead for violating the laws against prohibition.
Justice Brandeis, however, had a different view-a
different view of the Constitution, and a different view
about the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Certainly,
Brandeis wrote, the Constitution when originally
authored protected only against trespass. But when it
was authored, trespass was the only effective way to vio-
late someone's privacy. But in 1928 that was no longer
the case. In 1928, much of life had already moved onto
the wires. And much of private life was now conducted
on the telephone. In such a world, Brandeis argued, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment should be read to
protect privacy on the phone as much as privacy in the
home. To protect the same degree of privacy as the
framers did, Brandeis argued, it was necessary to pro-
tect against more than trespass.
Brandeis' technique should be ours as well. His
approach was to first identify values from the original
Fourth Amendment, and translate those values into the
context of cyberspace. Brandeis read beyond the specific
applications that the framers had in mind to find the
meaning that they intended to constitutionalize. His aim
was to carry that meaning of the framers into the con-
text of 1928.
We need the same technique today. We can't help but
consider the technologies, or as I've called them, the
architectures of privacy in evaluating the world of pri-
vacy we are entering. For the world we are entering is
about to change these architectures of privacy more com-
pletely and more extensively than any similar change in
the past. And we can see this change by considering two
stories-the first about the monitored; the second, about
the searchable.
Peter Lewis, writing in the NEW YORK TIMES, in an
article titled "Forget Big Brother," begins his story with
the following account:
Surveillance cameras followed the attractive
young blond woman through the lobby of the
midtown Manhattan hotel, kept a glassy eye
on her as she rode the elevator up to the 23rd
floor and peered discreetly down the hall as
she knocked at the door to my room. I have
not seen the videotapes, but I can imagine the
digital readout superimposed on the scenes,
noting the exact time of the encounter. That
would come in handy if someone were to ques-
tion later why this woman, who is not my
wife, was visiting my hotel room during a
recent business trip. The cameras later saw us
heading off to dinner and to the theater-a
middle aged married man from Texas with his
arm around a pretty East Village woman
young enough to be his daughter.
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"As a matter of fact," Lewis writes, "she is my daughter."
Lewis' is a story of the monitored-a hint of the
emerging world of monitoring that is already constitut-
ing life in real space, and which promises even greater
sway in cyberspace. Add to the cameras the credit card
receipts, the telephone logs, the airplane tickets, the toll
booths, the check-in records at the hotel, the records
from room service-add in all the records that get col-
lected in the ordinary course in life and the scope of mon-
itoring begins to be clear.
Cyberspace will be even worse-or better, depending
upon your perspective. Jerry Kang summarizes the dif-
ference well:
[I]magine the following two visits to a mall,
one in real space, the other in cyberspace. In
real space, you drive to a mall, walk up and
down its corridors, peer into numerous shops,
and stroll through corridors of inviting stores.
Along the way, you buy an ice-cream cone
with cash. You walk into a bookstore and flip
through a few magazines. Finally, you stop at
a clothing store and buy a friend a silk scarf
with a credit card. In this narrative, numer-
ous persons interact with you and collect
information along the way. For instance,
while walking through the mall, fellow visi-
tors visually collect information about you, if
for no other reason than to avoid bumping into
you. But such information is general-e.g., it
does not pinpoint the geographical location
and time of the sighting-is not in a format
that can be processed by a computer, is not
indexed to your name or another unique iden-
tifier, and is impermanent, residing in short-
term human memory. You remain a barely
noticed stranger. One important exception
exists: The scarf purchase generates data that
are detailed, computer-processable, indexed
by name, and potentially permanent.
By contrast, in cyberspace, the exception
becomes the norm: Every interaction is like
the credit card purchase. ... In this alternate
universe, you are invisibly stamped with a bar
code as soon as you venture outside your
home. There are entities called "road"
providers, who provide the streets and ground
you walk on, who track precisely where, when,
and how fast you traverse the lands, in order
to charge you for your wear on the infrastruc-
ture. As soon as you enter the cyber-mall's
domain, the mall begins to track you through
invisible scanners focused on your bar code. It
automatically records which stores you visit,
which windows you browse, in which order,
and for how long. The specific stores collect
even more detailed data when you enter their
domain. For example, the cyber-bookstore
notes which magazines you skimmed, record-
ing which pages you have seen and for how
long, and notes the pattern, if any, of your
browsing. It notes that you picked up briefly
a health magazine featuring an article on St.
John's Wort, read for seven minutes a news
weekly detailing a politician's sex scandal,
and flipped ever-so-quickly through a tabloid
claiming that Elvis lives. Of course, whenev-
er any item is actually purchased, the store as
well as the credit, debit, or virtual cash com-
pany that provides payment through cyber-
space, takes careful notes of what you bought-
in this case, a silk scarf, red, expensive.
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In both stories, the monitored increases. In both, the
scope of one's life subject to monitoring changes. In both
cases, this change is made possible by a change in the
architecture of each space. The architecture is designed
to capture data about our ongoing exchanges and trans-
actions in ordinary life.
The data that these systems collect are much like the
data that a community in small town might collect. But
again there are important differences. Unlike the data
that the community might collect, the information from
this monitoring is permanent and searchable. It is not
information collected and then discarded (since forgot-
ten); it is information that is collected, kept, and search-
able-and not by not just the community but by anyone
who wants access to its facts. Think of the billions of
gigabytes of e-mail messages stored across the world; or
the tapes of telephone records archived by telephone
companies; or the archives of frequent flyer miles, or
credit card receipts, or calling card debits, or cash
machines withdrawals, or toll booth records-think
about all these, and you begin to get a sense of the
extraordinary data that is coming to be collected as mat-
ter of routine, as a matter of what is ordinarily monitored.
This increase in the monitored increases the search-
able in two different ways. (1) More can be searched, as
more data are collected; (2) searching is cheaper, as the
monitored becomes more easy to scan. And this in turn
leads, perhaps paradoxically, to an even greater reduc-
tion in legal protections against such searches. Consider
each change in turn.
Consider each change in turn. The first change is the
more familiar, but we should separate its costs into two
parts. One part represents the costs borne by the
searcher; the other the costs borne by the person being
searched. The costs borne by the searcher are those costs
involved in executing the search-the time and expens-
es, etc. The costs borne by the person being searched are
not just the subjective costs, but also the intrusion and
disruption of the search.
Modern technologies are quickly reducing costs of either a file with a national security document, or an
both kinds. In real space, technologies such as telephoto illegal copy of some software code. The worm was
lenses, long distance microphones, infrared cameras, designed to search disks without the user noticing; it did
and body scans, all make it cheaper to detect whatever its work completely in background. If it found what it was
the searcher is seeking. And in cyberspace, looking for, it would report back to
the change is all the more dra- the FBI the location of
matic as data move onto a Limits, in other words, on the file; if it didn't,
common protocol net- searching-both practical and legal-are it would sim-
work, and systems for ply destroy
data matching be- being eroded. And the result of this erosion itself. The
come all the more, will be an ever-increasing range of one's life w o r m
sophisticated. In both that it is, at any time in the future, the would not
cases, the changes will 1 b 1t.
mean a sharp reduction in subject
the costs of a particular search,
and hence an increase, in this aspect at least,
of the searchable.
The same change is occurring with the costs borne by
the person being searched. For these same devices-
devices to scan bodies from a distance, devices to listen
through walls from hundreds of feet away, searches of
online data which the owner never notices, wiretapping
-have become efficient techniques for the searcher and
less burdensome for the person being searched.
But it is this second reduction that yields the paradox
that I adverted to earlier. For by increasing the efficien-
cy of a search, the changing technologies reduce the
legal justifications for interfering with the searches. As
searches become more efficient, the scope of "reasonable"
searches increases. In the ordinary case, the legal
grounds for limiting the power of the state to search
have been the burdens imposed on the person being
searched. So that as these burdens are removed, there is
less and less justification for limiting the state's right to
search. Thus as the costs of searching fall, the legal
grounds for restricting the search fall as well.
An example will make the point. Searches, the
Constitution requires, must be "reasonable." So consider
the following. Imagine a worm-a bit of computer code
designed to work its way across the net and locate holes
in the architecture of the net such that it can place itself
onto the hard disks of computer users. The worm is
designed not to do any damage. It does not attach itself
to any system or application file. The worm instead sim-
ply places itself onto a hard disk and searches that disk.
Say this worm were designed by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. And say the worm were designed to
search for a particular file-an illegal file, let's say,
ot discovery. search beyond its
mandate.
Would such a worm violate the
constitutional right of privacy? I believe this is a very
hard question. Certainly in a sense one might call this
an invasion of property, but no longer is the Fourth
Amendment tied to conceptions of property. The test
under the Fourth Amendment now is simply whether
the search is reasonable. Here, the search imposes no
burden on the innocent, and only burdens the guilty. It
is, in this sense, an efficient search. It is a general
search, but because it imposes none of the costs of a gen-
eral search, it might well be understood best as a rea-
sonable search-like the sniff of a dog at the airport,
except here there is not even the fear of the dog.
The worm is just an example, but it points to a more
general point. More is being monitored; more can be
searched cheaply; more can be searched without impos-
ing any burden on the person being searched-searched
efficiently, that is. Limits, in other words, on search-
ing-both practical and legal-are being eroded. And the
result of this erosion will be an ever-increasing range of
one's life that it is, at any time in the future, the subject
of discovery.
How should we understand this change? How should
we understand its source? Its source is the change we
will see in the architecture of a networked world. In real
space, the default is that data are not collected. In real
space, it takes effort-either the effort of a community,
or the effort of a spy-to gather data. That is the archi-
tecture of the real world. And for most of our history,
this architecture meant that any data so gathered were,
in essence, useless. It was costly to hold, costly to use,
and costly to collect.
But the architecture of cyberspace is different. Or
rather, the architecture is quickly becoming different. ics. Instead, where we have responded with laws, the
The architecture of cyberspace can be such that collect- laws are limited to particular problems or contexts. We
ing data is the default. The world there can be made have very effective protections for data about what
such that in the ordinary case, information is collected videos people rent, but only because a particular promi-
ceaselessly-invisibly, behind the scenes, efficient- nent American was embarrassed by the publica-
ly, with no burden on the user, tion of the records of the videos
The information is collect- monitoring be he rented. American
ed; it is more easily This would law is sporadic and
searched; and the done by the state- by a small group partial-incom-
legal protections separate from the community. And this plete, from the
against its search - • e significant, perspective of
- p r ot e c t io n s eparateness is extraordinarily signifcant, data privacy in
grounded in the bur- in two very different ways. Europe, and in-
den that a search would consequential for
create-disappear. most real protections.
And so should we ask: Just how should The reasons for this lack of law pro-
we respond? How should we respond to this change in tecting privacy are complex-they relate in part to a
technology-to these changes in the architecture of cyber- general skepticism about legal protection generally; they
space that yield a world unlike any we have known before. relate in the balance to the extraordinary lobbying
The answer is not obvious, but if we put it in a regu- power of interests that would use the data affected by
latory context, some possibilities might become clear, informational privacy regulation. And we should not
That is my aim in the next section-to sketch a way of expect this feature of American law to change dramati-
understanding this regulatory context, a model for cally in the short term. Privacy here is not about to be
understanding this problem of regulation. And in the protected by law in the way that privacy in Europe, and
final section, I'll use that model to help explain the dif- parts of Asia, is.
ferences in the responses of Europe and the United But does that mean that our privacy will remain vul-
States, and to say something about the possibilities nerable? Or put another way, is law the only kind of pro-
within each. tection we might expect? My sense is "no."
Think about the ways in which privacy is protected in
RESPONDING TO CHANGE real space-the many ways, and not just the protections
We should keep this issue in perspective. It is not as of law. The law is one protection for privacy, but it is not
if the last two hundred years before the Internet were the only protection, or the most important. Norms pro-
years without technological change. It is not as if we tect privacy as well. At least among individuals, norms
have never faced such questions before. Obviously, the limit the kinds of questions one might ask, or the kinds
question of individual privacy has been a dominant of gossip one might listen to. And among corporations,
theme in legal thought for much of modern legal history. norms restrict the kind of uses that these companies will
And plenty of nations have responded to the changes by make of the data they collect. These constraints are dif-
enacting legal proscriptions designed to replicate or cre- ferent from law-they are enforced, for example, not by
ate protections of an earlier period, the state, but by the sanctions of other members of a
Some nations have, but not the United States. For particular community. But they are nonetheless a
while most modern democracies have enacted significant source of constraint, functioning to protect privacy.
legal protections for privacy, we have not. We have been The market is another type of protection. Reputation
slower to respond and have been much more laissez- in the market is affected by the use corporations make of
faire in our response. We have no general federal statute privacy data, and in some cases, firms can offer more expen-
protecting privacy, whether informational privacy or sive services with a greater promise of privacy protection.
data privacy. We don't even have federal statutes effec- But in the story I've told so far, the most significant
tively protecting medical privacy-the only group with constraint protecting, or possibly eroding, privacy is the
that sort of protection is individuals in drug rehab lin- constraint of architecture. High walls make secure hous-
es; sophisticated locks keep all but the most skilled bur-
glar out; thick walls can't be listened through; thick cur-
tains don't reveal. All these are features of the architecture
of a particular space. And all these features in obvious
ways increase, or extend, the privacy of a particular space.
It is against this background, then, that we should
consider the state of data privacy today. For I've said
already that laws in America are relatively slight and
are unlikely to be strengthened anytime soon. But given
these alternatives, our question should be whether these
alternatives might supplement the law to create a con-
text in which privacy is protected. Do they provide alter-
natives to the law that might fill the gap that our lais-
sez-faire regime permits?
One alternative, for example, would be norms. This is
the solution of the Clinton Administration to the prob-
lem of data privacy. The administration wants industry
to develop codes for regulating the handing of personal
data. It wants industry to develop these codes on its
own, and then enforce them without the involvement of
the state. Industry would develop its own form of self-
regulation, and the state would rely on this self-regula-
tion to protect the privacy of its citizens.
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There is much to be skeptical about with this solution
-not the least of which being that the interests of com-
merce might well be different from the interests of the
consumer. But it represents an alternative, the effec-
tiveness of which must be considered when accounting
for the interests protecting privacy.
A second alternative is architecture-technologies for
re-creating privacy where other technologies may have
erased it. The most common example here is encryption
-especially public key encryption, which would facili-
tate individuals hiding more effectively facts about
themselves that they don't want third parties to know.
But encryption won't hide transactional data-it
won't hide the monitoring of clickstreams, or telephone
log records. And it won't easily hide records kept about
us by third parties-except to the extent those records
are protected by others. Moreover, encryption may actu-
ally increase the technologies of monitoring and search-
ing, for it facilitates an architecture within which iden-
tity can be established, and hence architectures which
will require that identity be established. Public key
encryption makes it easy to hide what one says. But it
also makes it easy to authenticate who one is.
Encryption facilitates both hiding and authenticating,
for the same technology that locks a conversation can be
used to verify an identity. A digital signature, for exam-
ple, can certify that I sent this, or a digital certificate can
certify that I am who I say I am. And it is this second
part of the technology for encryption-this part that
makes authentication possible-that we should consider
when weighing its effect on privacy.
As the cost of authenticating falls, we should expect
the use of authenticating technologies to increase. As it
is easier to say who I am, we should expect the growth of
technologies that ask who I am. The two will work
together, for knowing who I am is valuable data. Thus it
again will increase the data knowable, in a sense, by the
system; it again is an architecture that will advance the
ends of monitoring.
For this reason, I don't believe one can say-absolute-
ly, or without qualification-that the development of
encryption technologies will increase individual privacy.
In the terms that began this essay, encryption may well
reduce the searchable, by protecting what I hide; but by
reducing the cost of authentication, it might well
increase the monitored, and hence increase the search-
able again. The technology, like much in this field, is
Janus-faced-freedom-enhancing from one perspective,
control-enhancing from another.
A better solution, I suggest, is one that links the pro-
tection of architecture with the incentives of the market.
Information is an asset. It is a resource which has
become extremely valuable. And as it has become
extremely valuable, commerce has tried to exploit it.
This use has a cost-an externality borne by those who
would prefer that this data not be used. So the trick is to
construct a regime where those who would use the data
internalize this cost, by paying those whose data are used.
The laws of property are one such regime. If the law
gave individuals the rights to control their data, or more
precisely, if those who wanted to use that data had first
to secure the right to use it, then a negotiation would
occur over whether, and how much, data should be used.
The market could negotiate these rights, if a market in
these rights could be constructed.
The benefits of a market would be many. Most impor-
tant among these benefits would be the ability of the
market to recognize diversity. A property regime gives
the holder of the property right the power to hold out-
until the buyer is willing to pay what the seller
demands. But what this means is that people can hold
out to different degrees. The problem with this property
regime, however, is its costs of negotiating the price to
be paid. It would be impossible to imagine dickering
with each click on the web. So how could this property
regime be created?
It is here that the change in the architecture I allud-
ed to before comes into play. For there are a number of
designs that code writers are proposing that might make
this structure of negotiation possible.
One example is the regime of the Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P), designed by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C). P3P is a standard for negotiating
protocols on the web-a standard, that is, for negotiat-
ing protocols about privacy. It facilitates setting the
terms on which users will enter a site, for example, and
then only entering sites that satisfy those terms. In the
language of P3P's authors:
Sites with practices that fall within the range
of a user's preference could, at the option of
the user, be accessed "seamlessly." Otherwise,
users will be notified of a site's practices and
have the opportunity to agree to those terms or
other terms and continue browsing if they wish.
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The web has already made possible person-to-
machine communication and person-to-person communi-
cation. Architectures like P3P make possible machine-
to-machine communication. This means machines can
bear the cost of this negotiation and could act as our
agents to protect our privacy.
This solution again mixes both a market and archi-
tectural response. It is a solution that imagines the two
working together to create a kind of protection for priva-
cy that law alone couldn't provide. If successful, it might
protect some individual data-not all, and certainly not
for all purposes. But some, or perhaps enough, and cer-
tainly more than we now have.
LOOKING AHEAD,
We are fast entering an age where more can be
known, and more efficiently collected, then at any time
in our history ever. These changes are brought about by
a change in architectures. Of the constraints that might
protect privacy, this constraint-architecture-has
shifted most significantly. Its shift has an ambiguous
quality-it makes possible an efficiency we have not
before seen; and it makes likely an extent of monitoring
we have not yet known.
One response to this change is law-the response of
the Europeans. Laws could be enacted to reconstruct the
privacy lost. But there are other responses beyond law-
the response of norms, the market, and architecture. I
have sketched one that relies on the joint product of two
(architecture and the market), and no doubt there are
others. The loss of privacy is not inevitable. Responses
are possible.
That is the hopeful account. But I want now to end on
a note of skepticism, or better, anxiety, about where we
are. For as much as we might envision a time when
changes could restore a degree of privacy, we should not
ignore the changes that are already occurring, and the
vulnerability that these changes will create just now.
For the lack of laws protecting data notwithstanding,
governments are moving to take advantage of the effi-
ciencies these new architectures facilitate. In Taiwan,
for example, the government is developing smart card
technologies, combining national insurance information
and identity information-including fingerprints-on a
single card. These cards will also contain a digital sig-
nature, identifying the holder when used with a govern-
mental data base. They are envisioned to be complete
records for each individual-perfect identifications, and
perfect links with that person's past. Efficient IDs-far
better than the IDs we have today.
These efficiencies, of course, are valuable. But they
beg for structures that check their use. They beg for
structures built into the system that might help assure
that they don't become tools of misuse. As a balance to
these advances, we must create structures that assure con-
trol consistent with values of privacy within our tradition.
A kind of inefficiency should be built into these
emerging technologies-an inefficiency that makes it
harder for these technologies to be misused. Certainly, it
is hard to argue for features of the architecture in cyber-
space that will make it more difficult for government to
do its work. It is hard to argue that less is more.
But though hard, this is not an argument unknown in
the history of constitutional democracies. Indeed, it is
the core of much of the design of many of the most suc-
cessful-that we build into such constitutions structures
of restraint that check and limit the efficiency of gov-
ernment, protecting against the tyranny of the majority.
This view helps explain much about the common con-
stitutional rights in a constitutional democracy. They
are, as John Perry Barlow has called them, "bugs" in the
code of government: elements designed to make govern-
ment function less efficiently, so that rights are better
protected. These 'tugs" have value in contexts beyond
the context of constitutional rights. They also have value
in the very structure of government itself. One doesn't
want a perfectly efficient prosecutor, for fear that the
prosecution will grow tyrannical. One doesn't want an
unimpeded executive, for fear that the executive will
become arbitrary. One doesn't want a perfectly powerful
and efficient legislature. One builds into a constitution-
al democracy limits on effectiveness of governmental
power, to protect against abuse of that power.
The architectures of control that are emerging in this
cyberworld are not the architectures of control of the tra-
ditional community. Communities are not, or would not
be, monitoring behavior and enforcing norms through
self-enforcement. This monitoring would be done by the
state-by a small group separate from the community.
And this separateness is extraordinarily significant, in
two very different ways.
The first difference is size. The "community," howev-
er one understands that term, is not the group that is
controlling life in this emerging architecture of control.
The group that gets the benefit of these architectures of
control is the government. Governments, like guns, need
not be bad; but when, like guns, they are placed in the
wrong hands, they can become quite dangerous. And
this is what power through knowledge means: that a
small group has a great power, and that therefore the
risk of tyranny by this group is all the more great. The
rules or requirements that can be enforced by this gov-
ernment are not necessarily the rules or requirements
that would be enforced by the community. Its leaders get
their power by pretending to enforce the will of the com-
munity, but instead enforce whatever will the small
group might represent. They can stifle dissent-not
because the community necessarily would, but because
the architecture of control that has emerged gives them
the power to monitor.
The second difference is even more important. If we
have learned anything about how communities function
-if we have learned anything about the kinds of behav-
ior that support or sustain a community, and the kinds
of interventions that destroy it-then we have learned
that for a community to sustain itself, the community
itself must enforce its rules. The norms of a community
are sustained only so long as members of the communi-
ty are involved in the enforcement of those norms.
Norms can not be imposed externally, and in this con-
text governments are often external. If this enforcement
is performed by someone else-by the state, or by some
other separate enforcing entity-then the community
loses the practice of such enforcement and weakens its
bonds. Only an inefficient community can sustain itself
as a community; an efficient community (one that has
institutions to efficiently enforce its norms) would self-
destruct. If members don't bear the cost of enforcing the
rules of their community, the community will fade.
Privacy needs protection when architectures make
more transparent; it gets protection when law and code
give individuals greater control. I've described one solu-
tion to the problem that changes in the net are now cre-
ating. No doubt there are others. But my point is not
the particulars. My point is more general. What is
missing in discourse about cyberspace and its regulation
is a richer understanding of the range of architectures
that are possible. We must develop an attitude that ana-
lyzes architecture as critically as it analyzes laws-an
attitude that understands the politics in both. We will
only resolve finally and properly how this world should
be made when we understand that we, in this critical
sense, are responsible for its making. *
This essay is drawn from a lecture delivered at the Taiwan Net '98
conference in Taipei during March 1998.
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